In which ways is Trump challenging global governance during his second term?
Global governance rests on international organisations and agreements designed to manage cross-border problems – from climate change to public health – by providing global public goods. Since taking office one year ago, President Donald Trump has doubled down on his 'America First' foreign policy.
Trump II poses an unprecedented challenge to both the material and the ideational foundations of the global governance system. Materially, Trump II has withdrawn funding for or even terminated US participation in numerous international institutions, including the Paris Agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). While US relations with international institutions have always been ambivalent, the number of affected institutions and the speed of Trump II’s attacks is truly exceptional.
Moreover, while previous presidents framed their criticism in reform demands, Trump openly questions the ideational foundations of global governance through nationalist rhetoric and open ideological attacks. He portrays international institutions as threats to US sovereignty and interests, questioning their expertise and even denying some of the problems they were created to address, such as climate change and global health risks. Trump II openly broke international law, for instance by engaging in reciprocal tariffs as well as unilaterally threatening with and employing military force. The US is actively paralysing or replacing multilateral institutions with power-based bargaining and extortion.
The disengagement of the US as the most powerful state and co-creator of the rules-based multilateral order significantly weakens institutions’ capacity to address transnational challenges and sends a signal to other states that non-compliance is acceptable. Trump II might thereby accelerate the decline of global governance and the resurgence of traditional great-power politics, characterised by a disregard for institutional constraints, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, attempts to resolve this conflict outside established frameworks, and violations of international law in other violent conflicts.
Under what conditions can Trumpism act as a catalyst for the adaptive renewal of global governance rather than accelerating its erosion?
Global governance institutions ultimately depend on the support of powerful states. If they follow Trump’s example, abandon multilateral institutions and engage in self-centred, transactional foreign policy, this will accelerate the transition to an order of great-power politics. But especially other Western powers and the European Union can also step up in favour of global governance and try to adapt and reform international organisations and agreements. Supporters of global governance can try to appease Trump to keep the US at the table, or they can actively defend institutions and fill the gaps left by US withdrawal. During Trump I, Western powers pursued a strategy of appeasement through accommodation in global governance institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the World Bank that addressed Trump’s dissatisfaction.
Western powers also opted to defend global governance institutions in other cases. They publicly reaffirmed the value of contested institutions, shamed US transgressions, and mobilised additional funding. Examples of successful alternative leadership in response to Trump I include the Paris Agreement and the World Trade Organisation. As collaboration between Western and non-Western powers was often essential to save institutions in the absence of the US, the result was often a better representation of the Global South and its interests.
Either way, the leadership by Western powers to Trump I contributed to the resilience of most challenged institutions and their adaptation to the new geopolitical circumstances. The lesson is that Trumpism can be effectively countered.
Does the proliferation of low-cost institutions and hybrid governance arrangements strengthen or undermine the long-term legitimacy and effectiveness of formal global governance institutions?
Formal international agreements and organisations have been the backbone of global governance since the Second World War. They particularly flourished after the Cold War. In addition, the last two decades saw the proliferation of low-cost institutions, such as informal intergovernmental organisations, transgovernmental networks, and transnational public-private partnerships. In many areas, global governance has become institutionally dense and hybrid.
These types of institutions differ in their strengths and weaknesses. Formal institutions tend to have an inclusive, often universal membership, and their procedures constrain great powers and provide weaker states with a voice. This lends legitimacy to their decisions. Moreover, the secretariats of international organisations can provide unique expertise to effectively address global problems. Low-cost institutions, by contrast, are often characterised by a more exclusive membership of like-minded powerful states, a lack of secretariats, and their decisions are not binding. This makes them more flexible and enables quick decision-making. These differences are reflected in a clear pattern of US contestation preceding Trump: the US remains engaged in those institutions that it can dominate and tries to reform them from within; it disengages from institutions it lacks control over and shifts to informal and minilateral alternatives.
The proliferation of low-cost institutions can thus be part of the challenge to effective and legitimate global governance. For instance, Trump I set up the Artemis Accords for space exploration to circumvent respective negotiations in the UN. The creation of the Board of Peace by Trump II even challenges the UN in general. In addition, overlapping institutions in dense governance spaces are generally prone to inefficient duplication and conflict due to their stakeholders’ diverging interests. Competition over resources accelerates when the US withdraws from entire governance domains, such as environmental protection or sexual and reproductive health and rights.
At the same time, low-cost institutions can also contribute to the resilience of global governance by complementing less flexible formal institutions. For instance, in response to the US blockade of the WTO and its dispute settlement procedures, the EU took the lead and established the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement as an informal workaround. The dense and hybrid global health regime allowed a coalition of powerful states and international organisations to orchestrate a joint response of low-cost institutions and the WHO after Trump I ceased US contributions and membership during the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, informal fora like the G7 or G20 can serve as a first stage of negotiation among powerful states in times of heightened geopolitical conflict, accommodating US concerns before seeking legitimation for decisions in more inclusive, formal institutions.
It, thus, comes down to leadership: the defenders of fair and effective global governance can use low-cost institutions as flexible instruments to mitigate shocks, such as Trump’s disengagement from formal institutions. In the absence of leadership, overlapping institutions compete over scare resources and LCIs can become the sites of a power-based order in which weaker states lack a voice.
How do heightened geopolitical conflicts reshape the strategic scenario of global governance defenders in responding to US contestation under Trump II?
The current geopolitical conflicts constrain Western states’ ability to actively respond to Trump II. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s dependence on the US has become very salient. In turn, the EU and European governments are now more hesitant to openly defend global governance in fear of retaliation by the US. Public defences of institutions like the Paris Agreement, the WHO, and UNESCO that Trump II has once again challenged have been more restrained than under Trump I. Western states fail to strongly condemn open transgressions of international law, such as the military attacks against Venezuela and Iran, or the threats against Greenland. The severe budgetary crisis facing the UN and its various agencies, funds, and programmes remains largely unaddressed. Instead, Western states tend to yield towards pressure from Trump II, even if this means acting against international law. For instance, the EU’s tariff arrangement with the US contravenes free-trade rules and undermines the WTO.
Europe’s prioritisation of defence spending also means it has fewer resources available to support global governance. In combination with the rise of authoritarian populism in Europe, this is currently driving the EU and many of its member state governments toward transactional politics and a narrow definition of national and European interests over global public goods, as well as a decline in development aid and cooperation with multilateral agencies.
It is important for Western powers, and especially the EU, to acknowledge that maintaining the rules-based order and global governance institutions is in their very strategic interest, and to rebalance their response to Trump II. Despite their appeasement attempts so far, US security guarantees appear increasingly uncertain with Trump’s annexation plans for Greenland and threats against European allies. Moreover, while autonomous defence capacities are certainly necessary for Europe to mitigate security dependence, it is unlikely that Western governments, let alone the EU, will become great powers on a par with the US or China anytime soon.
Maintaining the rules-based order will allow governments in the West and the EU to fully leverage their strengths: economic and soft power. As credible advocates of multilateralism, Western powers can take the lead, forge coalitions with like-minded partners from the Global South, and adapt global governance to withstand Trump II and address the pressing problems of our times.
Dr. Tim Heinkelmann-Wild is a Max Weber Fellow who specialises in international relations and European politics. His research interests focus on the contestation of multilateral institutions and the relationship between power and international order. Among his most recent publications are “(De-)Coding ‘America First’: Trump’s Contestation of International Institutions and its Consequences” (International Affairs, 2026), “Destruction or Renewal? Trumpism and the Future of Global Governance” (Global Public Policy and Governance, 2025, with Benjamin Faude), and “How Negative Institutional Power Moderates Contestation: Explaining Dissatisfied Powers’ Strategies towards International Institutions” (Review of International Organizations, 2025, with Benjamin Daßler and Andreas Kruck). His research project at the EUI investigates how Europe responds to the US withdrawal from multilateral cooperation and the transatlantic partnership.
Photo credits: The White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.