Marlene Thomas, a doctoral researcher at the EUI Department of Economics, conducts research on how criminal networks affect the legal economy in regions in Southern Italy.
“When people hear the word mafia, they often think of movie scenes — The Godfather, Gomorrah, or other cinematic portrayals of organised crime. Whenever I tell people that I research organised crime, or the mafia, they are often surprised, as if it were a phenomenon disconnected from contemporary economic life.”
Marlene comments that, in Italy, organised crime remains deeply rooted in several regions. While historically concentrated in the south, criminal groups have increasingly expanded into northern regions, primarily by infiltrating the legal economy.
“The presence of organised crime in certain areas distorts competition, discourages investment, and undermines trust in public institutions, affecting everyday economic life in subtle but pervasive ways,” she emphasises.
Marlene points out that these dynamics are not limited to Italy, but that similar patterns can be observed in other countries, including Spain, Germany, the United States, and several Latin American economies. In each case, criminal organisations adapt to different institutional environments while relying on comparable logics of control and influence.
“What interests me is how organised crime operates not only through illegal activities, but especially through the infiltration of the legal economy,” she says. Marlene specifies that a large share of criminal profits worldwide is, in fact, reinvested in legitimate businesses, allowing criminal organisations to influence otherwise legal markets. According to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, around 70% of global criminal revenues are laundered through the legal economy.
In her first project, Marlene studies the effects of the infiltration of criminal networks into the functioning of legal markets in southern Italy—specifically how it shapes competition among firms for public procurement contracts. Because organised crime typically targets sectors with substantial and predictable public funding, public procurement (the system through which public bodies award contracts for goods, services, and public works) is especially vulnerable.
Specifically, Marlene analyses how competition for public contracts changes when a local government is dismissed due to mafia infiltration. She explains that, under this anti-corruption policy, known as a city council dismissal, the Italian central government dissolves the elected municipal government and appoints an external commissioner to run the municipality for about two years.
“Since the introduction of this policy in 1991, more than 350 Italian municipalities have been dismissed on these grounds, with an average of around ten cases per year,” she reveals.
The Italian setting provides her with a unique opportunity to observe how competition among firms for public procurement contracts is affected when ties between local governments and organised crime are disrupted.
“Focusing on contracts awarded directly by the dismissed municipalities, I find that, following a city council dismissal, the pool of firms competing for public contracts becomes significantly more diverse.” Marlene’s research reveals a marked increase in the rotation of participating firms, suggesting that new or previously excluded businesses are able to enter public tenders once city councils have been dissolved.
She adds that this increase in firm turnover goes hand in hand with changes in how procurement procedures are managed by the external commissioners appointed after a dismissal. Instead of relying on direct awards—where contracts are assigned to a single firm without any competitive process and with limited transparency—municipalities run by commissioners increasingly shift toward restricted procedures. These are auction-based (i.e. there is a competitive process) but allow for the screening of participants beforehand.
Marlene clarifies that these procedures differ from fully open auctions, where any firm can participate and authorities have little ability to screen bidders in advance. Under the restricted procedures used more frequently after city council dismissals, competition is preserved through an auction, but public officials retain the discretion to select which firms are invited to participate.
“This form of discretion does not eliminate competition. Rather, it allows authorities to exclude businesses suspected of collusion or criminal ties while still ensuring that multiple firms compete for the contract,” she specifies.
These changes—city council dismissals and the increased use of restricted procurement procedures—point to a reconfiguration of procurement practices, broadening access for new or previously excluded firms and reducing the ability of organised crime to control public contracts.
In a second project, ‘Networks of Organized Crime: Clan Dynamics and the Legal Economy’, Marlene analyses the impact of organised crime on the legal economy from a different angle.
The project has received funding through the early-stage researchers programme of the EUI, as well as from the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance in Rome.
In this case, she explains, “I focus on the relationships within organised criminal networks and on how these internal dynamics also affect the legal economy.”
Together with her co-authors, Marlene is building a vast dataset that maps both the presence and the interactions of organised crime clans across all southern Italian regions. This project is currently in the data construction and exploratory phase.
“We study whether municipalities where clans or mafia families cooperate experience different economic outcomes compared to municipalities where clans are in conflict.” This approach is innovative because it moves beyond simply identifying where organised crime is present. It also distinguishes how it operates, capturing different types of mafia activity and their potentially distinct economic consequences. Rather than documenting results at this stage, the project formulates hypotheses on how internal clan dynamics may shape local economic outcomes.
“One hypothesis is that in areas where clans compete or are in conflict, rivalry may lead to instability and episodes of violence. This uncertainty could discourage investment, make it riskier for new businesses to open, and push existing firms to reduce activity or leave the market altogether.”
In contrast, Marlene points out that areas dominated by a single clan or by coordinated groups may appear more stable. However, this stability is often achieved through systematic economic control. She adds that, in these settings, practices such as extortion—the extraction of regular payments from businesses through threats or intimidation in exchange for being allowed to operate without interference—may be more consistently enforced. While this could reduce open conflict, extortion would impose persistent costs on firms, potentially lowering profits or leading to higher prices for consumers.
“Both situations—violent rivalry versus coordinated control—may distort market functioning, but through different channels, leading to distinct predicted economic outcomes for firms and consumers”, she notes.
The common thread across Marlene’s projects is understanding how organised crime interacts with the legal economy—how it shapes markets, influences institutions, and restricts opportunities for firms and citizens.
“I aim to provide evidence that can help public institutions design more effective policies, support legitimate businesses and final consumers, and ultimately improve living conditions in communities affected by organised crime,” she concludes.
Marlene Thomas is a doctoral researcher at the EUI Department of Economics. Her PhD thesis titled ‘Essays in Applied Public and Political Economics’ is supervised by EUI Professor Alessandro Tarozzi (supervisor) and EUI Professor Fabrizia Mealli (co-supervisor). Marlene is the principal investigator of the research project ‘Networks of Organised Crime: Clan Dynamics and the Legal Economy’ which has received funding via the EUI call 2025 dedicated to early-stage researchers.
Image generated by AI (ChatGPT).