Emil Kamalov, a PhD researcher at the EUI Department of Political and Social Sciences, is a co-author of the OutRush project report, a major new study examining the political attitudes, mobility choices, and long-term prospects of Russian emigrants who left the country following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. His findings were also recently featured in an article in The New York Times exploring why many Russian exiles are choosing to remain abroad, even amid talks of ceasefire.
In this interview, we ask him about the key findings of the OutRush project and what they reveal about the future paths of Russian emigrants after the 2022 invasion.
Your latest report challenges the narrative that Russian emigrants are returning home following the Ukraine war. What key findings suggest that the most highly skilled professionals intend to remain abroad, even if the conflict ends?
Our data strongly suggest that, contrary to the widespread narrative about Russian emigrants returning home in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the reality is quite different. Most of those who left—particularly highly skilled professionals—are choosing to stay abroad. In many cases, if their initial destination doesn't work out, they tend to move on to a third country rather than return to Russia. Between 2023 and 2024, only around 8% of the emigrants we surveyed had returned to Russia, while about 21% had relocated again to another country. Around one in five made a secondary move during that period, and nearly 30% said they were actively considering doing the same within the next year.
For more than half of those who say they do not plan to return in the near future, the idea of going back remains a distant possibility, and it's almost always tied to hopes for major political change in Russia, not just peace. Many of these individuals, including IT specialists and other professionals, left the country for political reasons and, in some cases, as an explicit act of protest against the current regime.
For them, the war ending isn't enough to bring them back; what would really matter is real, lasting change in Russia's political and social life. Realistically, that doesn't seem to be on the horizon right now.
What are the main motivations behind this ongoing movement, and what destinations are emerging as more or less sustainable for long-term resettlement?
The motivations behind this secondary migration are varied but consistently rooted in practical and political challenges. Legal uncertainties are a major factor—emigrants often face unclear or shifting visa regulations, lack of long-term residency prospects, or other bureaucratic hurdles. In some cases, experiences of discrimination or a general sense of cultural or social mismatch push people to seek out a better environment. For many, the first landing point was chosen out of urgency, so it’s not surprising that a fair number are re-evaluating their choices after settling in.
Among the destinations, Serbia stands out as a destination attracting secondary migrants, largely because of its relatively favourable migration policies and a more welcoming environment. On the other hand, countries like Turkey and Georgia—initially popular due to their proximity and ease of entry—are now seeing increased outflows. In those places, legal status and general conditions have gotten harder, making it harder for emigrants to build sustainable lives.
At the same time, those who have settled in more stable, democratic countries, such as Germany, Spain, or the US, tend to express stronger intentions to stay for the long term. Even though integration can be challenging, these locations offer a greater sense of predictability, stability, and a good political environment.
How has the war reshaped political engagement among Russian emigrants? Are they turning away from Russian politics entirely, or finding new forms of activism abroad?
Political engagement among Russian emigrants remains strong, but the ways people get involved are changing. While there has been a slight decline in active interest in Russian politics (dropping from 92% to 85%), this still reflects a high level of involvement, especially when compared to other diaspora communities. The decrease can be attributed to a number of factors, including emotional fatigue, growing scepticism about the effectiveness of certain forms of activism (particularly protests), and lingering fears of repression, even outside Russia.
Still, a striking 41% of surveyed Russian emigrants voted in the 2024 Russian presidential election from abroad, which is notable—especially if you take into account its symbolic nature, as it is still voting in autocratic elections. To put this in perspective, only about 17% of Chilean emigrants participated in their home country’s 2017 elections.
In addition to formal political participation, many emigrants stay closely connected through independent Russian media outlets, which continue to play a vital role in maintaining a sense of connection and shared purpose.
At the same time, a growing number of emigrants are beginning to engage with the political landscapes of their host countries. Between 2023 and 2024, the proportion of emigrants following local politics rose from 61% to 68%. For many, this shift doesn't signal a turning away from Russian affairs, but rather an expansion of political consciousness.
In the broader picture, what we’re seeing is that the diaspora community remains politically aware and committed, even as the forms of activism continue to shift in response to new realities.
You highlight that many emigrants see political reform in Russia as a precondition for return. What kinds of reforms are they hoping for, and do they view them as plausible in the near future?
People are pretty clear that they’re not just waiting for the war to end. For most emigrants, the decision to return would depend on real, concrete political reforms in Russia. That means things like genuinely fair elections, protection of basic civil rights and freedoms, and amnesty for political prisoners. These are the kinds of changes people say would have to happen before they’d even start to think seriously about moving back.
That said, there is very little optimism about the short-term prospects for such change. Even in a best-case scenario where things in Russia started heading in a more democratic direction, many emigrants say they’d still take a “wait and see” approach. They’d want to be sure the reforms are not just temporary or superficial, but real and lasting. After everything that’s happened, there’s a lot of scepticism, and people are understandably cautious. No one is rushing to make big decisions based on uncertain developments.
Given that many of these emigrants have settled permanently since the war began, what should host countries be doing to better support and integrate this skilled and politically aware population?
There’s a real potential here for a kind of ‘brain gain’, especially if host countries take steps to support these emigrants in settling down and putting their skills to use. Many of the people who left Russia since the war began are highly educated and politically engaged, and most of them want to build stable lives where they are. But to make that possible, host countries need to address some key challenges.
The biggest issue that comes up again and again is legal status. More than half of emigrants still feel uncertain about their residency, work permits, or access to basic services. Streamlining these processes—making them clearer, faster, and more transparent—would go a long way in helping people feel they can truly settle.
Another important area is language learning and fighting discrimination. Most emigrants want to settle in and contribute, but ultimately, if things are too hard or unpredictable, people will keep moving on—looking for countries that offer more support and stability. But for host countries that are willing to step up, there’s a real benefit: They’ll gain motivated and highly skilled residents who can contribute meaningfully to fields like IT, research, and entrepreneurship.
Emil Kamalov is a researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences. His thesis title is ‘Challenging Autocracies from Abroad: Essays on Russian Political Emigration (2022–2024)’. Emil’s thesis supervisor is former EUI Professor Miriam A. Golden.
Read the latest OutRush report ‘On the Move: Mobility, Integration, and the Dynamics of Russian Emigration in 2022–2024’ by Emil Kamalov, Karolina Nugumanova, and Ivetta Sergeeva, published on SSRN.