Laurent Mathevet (Ph.D. California Institute of Technology, 2008) joined the Institute in September 2021 after holding positions at New York University (2013-2021) and the University of Texas at Austin (2008-2013). His research is in economic theory with a focus on incentive design and incomplete information. What started as two separate interests evolved into one: the design of incentives through information or information design. In environments where individuals have incomplete information about key variables, information can be used to affect their behavior. For example, marketing, political campaigns, academic grading systems, and even informal conversations are forms of information disclosure often seeded with an intention. His research has been published in international journals such as AEJ Microeconomics, AER Insights, Games and Economic Behavior, the Journal of Economic Theory, the Journal of Political Economy, and Theoretical Economics.

Supervisees

Fields of expertise

Game theory Mechanism design Information economics