The conflict involving Iran, developments in the Strait of Hormuz, and reports of human rights abuses and widespread suffering have featured prominently across international news coverage and public debate. At the same time, public reactions have ranged from protests and expressions of support to graphic footage and intense disagreement, while many have refrained from taking a position due to the complexity and uncertainty surrounding available information. Against this backdrop, what lies behind the conflict, who shapes its dynamics, and what could help move toward de-escalation?
In this interview, Max Weber Fellow Mohammad Eslami draws on his research to explain the complex nature of the conflict, the actors involved, the range of measures already taken to address it, and the possible paths toward resolution.
For readers trying to make sense of the tensions involving Iran, could you provide some context? Who are the key actors involved, and what aspects of this conflict are often missing from public discussions?
Understanding tensions involving Iran requires situating the conflict within broader regional and global dynamics, instead of viewing it as a simple one-on-one conflict. At the core are three principal actors: Iran, the United States, and Israel. However, the conflict is embedded in a broader network that includes regional states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Beyond these state actors, Iran is also supported by non-state actors such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.
A critical but often overlooked dimension is the way insecurity is built into the region’s political structure. Iran perceives itself as encircled by US military infrastructure and allied states, while the US and its partners frame Iran as a revisionist power seeking regional dominance. This mutual threat perception creates a classic security dilemma, where defensive measures by one side are interpreted as offensive by the other.
Additionally, public discussions frequently omit the role of economic warfare, particularly sanctions, which have functioned as a central tool of pressure against Iran. These measures have shaped decision-making within Iran and pushed it toward responses that don’t directly match the actions taken against it. Another frequently overlooked dimension is how these conflicts spread across the wider region through proxy groups and indirect confrontations. Rather than direct interstate war, competition unfolds across multiple theatres, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
Another missing element is the maritime dimension, particularly the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global energy flows. Control over such chokepoints introduces global economic stakes into what might otherwise appear as a regional conflict.
In your work you outline the evolution of Iran’s military strategy from the ‘forward defence’ doctrine to the potential of obtaining nuclear weapons. Could you walk us through this evolution and explain how ideology or religion has shaped these shifts in strategy?
Iran’s military strategy has undergone significant transformation since the early years following the Iranian Revolution. Initially shaped by the experience of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran adopted a defensive posture focused on territorial integrity and regime survival. Over time, this evolved into the doctrine of ‘forward defence’, which emphasises projecting influence beyond national borders to deter threats before they reach Iranian territory.
This strategy relies heavily on asymmetric capabilities, including missile systems, drone warfare, and partnerships with non-state actors such as Hezbollah. The objective has been to keep potential threats at a distance and impose costs on adversaries without engaging in conventional large-scale warfare. This approach reflects both material constraints and deliberate strategic choices, allowing Iran to offset the technological superiority of rivals like the US.
More recently, debates have emerged regarding a potential shift toward a nuclear deterrent posture. While Iran remains a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the erosion of agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has intensified internal discussions about the credibility of non-nuclear deterrence. From a strategic standpoint, nuclear capability, whether actual or latent, could serve as a deterrent against regime-threatening interventions.
From a non-proliferation perspective, I have argued that air campaigns against nuclear sites are counterproductive and may lead to the opposite effect, increasing incentives for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For this reason, I am opposed to military operations and armed conflicts against Iran, no matter whether the country wants to develop nukes or not.
Ideology and religion play a complex role in this evolution. The Islamic Republic’s identity incorporates principles such as resistance to external domination and support for oppressed groups, which inform its regional policies. However, strategic decisions are not purely ideological; they are shaped by pragmatic assessments of threat, capability, and opportunity. Religious discourse often provides legitimacy and mobilisation, while the underlying strategy reflects rational adaptation to a hostile security environment.
The US and Israel have been heavily involved in conflicts across the Middle East, including Iran. How would you characterise their role, and what consequences have their military and diplomatic actions had for the region?
The roles of the US and Israel in the region cannot be assessed purely through the lens of deterrence and security; they must also be evaluated in terms of the humanitarian and legal consequences of their actions. Over time, the pattern that has emerged is not one of conflict resolution, but of cyclical escalation—where military pressure, sanctions, and pre-emptive actions have repeatedly reinforced instability rather than reducing it.
From my research perspective, this cycle of hostility must be interrupted. The continued reliance on force as a primary policy instrument has contributed to widespread human suffering across multiple theatres, including Palestine and Iran. As a global power, the US carries a heightened responsibility not only to pursue its strategic interests but also to uphold international humanitarian norms. Continued involvement, directly or indirectly, in actions that result in large-scale civilian harm risks undermining its credibility and the broader international legal order.
One of the most troubling dimensions of recent developments has been the human cost of escalation. Reports from incidents such as the attack on a school in Minab in southern Iran on 28 February, where a significant number of civilians—including children and educators—were reportedly killed, highlight the devastating consequences of modern conflict environments. Whether examined through legal, ethical, or strategic frameworks, such events underscore the urgent need to reassess the trajectory of confrontation.
Similarly, ongoing violence in Palestine continues to raise profound concerns regarding proportionality, civilian protection, and long-term political consequences. The normalisation of high-intensity military responses in densely populated areas risks entrenching grievances across generations.
A sustainable regional order cannot emerge from perpetual coercion. It requires a deliberate shift away from escalation toward accountability, diplomacy, and restraint. Without such a shift, particularly from major powers, the region risks remaining locked in a self-reinforcing cycle of violence with no clear strategic or moral endpoint.
Russia and China often get less attention in discussions about the Middle East. From your research, how do their actions shape the balance of power in the region, and why does it matter for global security?
The roles of Russia and China are increasingly significant in shaping the balance of power in the Middle East, albeit through very different approaches. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to engage directly in military affairs, most notably in Syria, thereby positioning itself as both a security actor and a diplomatic broker. Its strategy reflects both an effort to expand its influence and a tendency to engage where it can benefit, often stepping in as Western countries withdraw.
In contrast, China’s role is more economic, structural, and, in many respects, more stabilising. From my perspective, there is a degree of admiration for the model China has adopted in the region. Its emphasis on working cooperatively with all regional states, regardless of political alignment, has allowed it to maintain balanced relations across competing blocs. Unlike other major powers, China has largely adhered to a principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and has avoided direct involvement in military conflicts or the imposition of economic sanctions.
This approach, anchored in initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, prioritises connectivity, trade, and long-term economic partnerships. By refraining from dictating political outcomes or imposing ideological conditions, China presents itself as a reliable and predictable partner for regional states. This has made it particularly attractive to countries seeking economic development without external political pressure.
That said, this model is not without implications for global security. China’s growing economic footprint, especially in energy infrastructure and critical maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, gives it increasing strategic influence. While its current posture is non-military, its long-term role may evolve as its interests deepen.
The presence of Russia and China contributes to a more multipolar regional order. China’s approach, in particular, offers an alternative framework, one that emphasises economic interdependence and political restraint over coercion and confrontation.
What policy approaches could realistically reduce the risk of military and nuclear escalation in the region?
Reducing the risk of military and nuclear escalation in the Middle East requires a combination of realistic and gradual policy changes rather than comprehensive, immediate solutions. First, restoring structured dialogue mechanisms is essential. Reviving or adapting frameworks similar to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could provide a foundation for managing nuclear risks, particularly through verification and transparency measures involving the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Second, de-escalation should focus on regional security arrangements. Establishing forums that include Iran, Gulf states, and external powers could help address mutual threat perceptions and reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. Confidence-building measures, such as communication hotlines and maritime incident agreements in the Persian Gulf, would be practical starting points.
Third, sanctions policy requires adjustment. While sanctions are a tool of leverage, their overuse can cause resistance and reduce incentives for compromise. A step-by-step approach, where sanctions are eased in return for actions that can be independently checked, may create a more lasting agreement.
Fourth, addressing proxy dynamics is critical. Encouraging localised ceasefires and political settlements in conflict zones such as Yemen and Lebanon can reduce the broader regional temperature.
An additional and essential dimension concerns the conduct of external and regional actors. The US should avoid further large-scale military campaigns in the Middle East, as repeated interventions have historically contributed to cycles of instability rather than sustainable security. At the same time, regional countries bear responsibility for not allowing foreign powers to use their airspace or territory as platforms for military operations against neighbouring states. Such practices risk expanding conflicts geographically, drawing additional actors into confrontation, and ultimately bringing instability onto their own soil, as demonstrated during escalatory episodes in March and April 2026.
Finally, major powers, including the US, Russia, and China, must coordinate to prevent escalation. Even limited cooperation on crisis management can significantly reduce risks.
In essence, stability will depend not on eliminating competition, but on managing it through rules, communication, mutual restraint, and a clear commitment to avoiding policies that expand conflict beyond controllable limits.
Mohammad Eslami is a Max Weber Fellow at the EUI department of Political and Social Sciences. His research focuses on international security, arms control, nuclear proliferation, emerging military technologies, the global arms trade, and Middle East security. He has published widely in journals such as International Affairs, Third World Quarterly, Global Policy, Review of International Studies, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, among others. He is the co-editor of academic books such as The Arms Race in the Middle East (Springer) and AI and International Security (Manchester University Press), and the author of Drones, Race, and International Security (Springer).
As a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Mohammad will explore the emergence of three Middle Eastern states—namely Iran, Turkey, and Israel—as international arms suppliers. His project will examine the intersection of global arms networks with regional power dynamics, contributing to broader debates in international security and foreign policy.
Photo credits: Moslem Daneshzadeh via Unsplash