The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 initiated the deadliest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Since then, Russian air strikes against residential areas and civilian infrastructure – including energy grids in the dead of winter – have wounded or killed tens of thousands of civilians, while more than 150,000 Ukrainian combatants have been killed or are missing, and millions more are displaced around Europe or internally.
In the fourth year of the invasion and its resistance, Miranda Loli, Max Weber Fellow at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, argues that the war in Ukraine is happening not only on the battlefield and in negotiation talks; it is also happening on and through time.
Could you tell us more about time in politics, particularly in the case of Ukraine?
Time in politics is not just a neutral clock ticking in the background. Different actors operate according to different temporal logics, and these differences become especially visible during crises. There is war time, which focuses on immediate survival and daily security needs. But simultaneously, there is reconstruction time: planners who are scheduling projects years ahead and settling long-term infrastructure goals, as well as working toward European integration standards. These are not just different perspectives. They create political conflicts over priorities and resources. There has always been a political element to decisions on whose priorities – or timelines – take precedence; however, in this case, it is also a battle for agency. When international donors insist on lengthy accountability processes and Ukrainian officials argue for faster action, they are negotiating more than just procedures. They're determining who has authority to set the pace of reconstruction and which temporal framework structures the entire governance process.
What are temporal boundaries?
Temporal boundaries are the distinctions we draw between phases like war and peace, emergency and normalcy, or present and future. These boundaries structure what kinds of actions are considered legitimate and which institutions have authority at any given moment.
International reconstruction has traditionally followed a sequence: Conflict ends, stabilisation occurs, then reconstruction begins. Ukraine challenges this model by necessity - rebuilding happens while conflict continues. This creates genuine ambiguity about which governance frameworks should apply.
The practical stakes are significant. Emergency framings permit expedited procedures and suspended oversight mechanisms. Reconstruction framings trigger different requirements, such as environmental assessments, competitive procurement, long-term sustainability planning. How these boundaries get drawn determines not just timing but resource allocation, accountability structures, and decision-making authority.
What did you observe when attending the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome last year?
The Rome conference brought together over 6,000 participants - government officials, international organisations, private sector representatives, and civil society - to coordinate reconstruction efforts and mobilise funding commitments.
One panel on defence sector development illustrated the tensions I am studying. During the discussion, participants' phones alerted them to missile strikes in Ukraine. One organiser briefly left to contact family. The panel continued. A speaker noted ‘I wish this was called the Russian Defeat Conference, not the Recovery Conference’, articulating the challenge of planning long-term reconstruction during active conflict.
What interested me analytically was how actors navigated these competing demands. Ukrainian participants organised several panels independently when they felt existing structures moved too slowly or didn't address their priorities adequately. Discussions shifted between immediate security concerns - drone technology, military procurement - and decade-long infrastructure projects. Representatives negotiated not just funding amounts, but the conditions attached to assistance and who would have authority over implementation decisions.
The conference functions as more than a fundraising venue. It's quickly becoming a recurring diplomatic ritual that establishes coordination rhythms, legitimizes certain governance approaches, and creates spaces where competing visions of Ukraine's future get negotiated.
What role, if any, has the EU played in the temporal boundary setting in the reconstruction process of Ukraine?
The EU has significantly shaped reconstruction temporalities through the Ukraine Facility, allocating €50 billion from 2024-2027. This instrument explicitly links recovery funding to Ukraine's EU integration trajectory and requires governance reforms as conditionality - even during active conflict.
This approach effectively reframes reconstruction as concurrent with, rather than sequential to, war. The EU isn't waiting for conflict resolution before engaging with long-term institutional transformation. They're treating these as parallel processes.
However, this creates practical friction. EU institutional processes typically involve extended consultation periods, detailed compliance monitoring, and staged disbursement conditional on reform implementation. These bureaucratic temporalities don't always align with wartime operational requirements or the urgency Ukrainian actors experience.
The EU has shown some adaptive capacity - repurposing instruments like the European Peace Facility for military aid represents institutional innovation. They've also adjusted procurement timelines and developed new coordination mechanisms. But tensions persist between donor accountability requirements and recipient demands for flexibility and speed. How these tensions get resolved will likely influence reconstruction governance frameworks beyond Ukraine.
What actions or approaches by the Ukrainian government and/or society have enabled its success in establishing Ukraine's temporal authority in its wartime reconstruction?
Ukrainian actors have developed several approaches to assert influence over reconstruction timing and priorities, despite asymmetric material relationships with international donors.
They've invested in independent infrastructure. The DREAM platform, according to its founders, is now used by 87% of Ukrainian municipalities and all central ministries, creating domestic capacity for project monitoring and coordination. This reduces dependence on donor-designed systems and establishes Ukrainian frameworks as the baseline for international engagement.
Ukrainian officials have also demonstrated willingness to proceed independently when international coordination moves too slowly. At the Rome conference, when established processes did not accommodate Ukrainian priorities, they organised additional programming themselves. This is not confrontational - it is a pragmatic assertion of agency.
There is strategic framing work happening as well. Ukrainian representatives connect reconstruction to sovereignty and resistance narratives, making it difficult for international partners to impose strict sequencing (first security, then recovery). By positioning rebuilding as integral to defence rather than separate from it, they maintain claims on multiple resource streams simultaneously.
Additionally, Ukrainian actors increasingly invoke their direct experience with wartime governance as conferring legitimacy. When discussing accountability mechanisms or procurement procedures, they reference practical knowledge gained under combat conditions. This experiential authority sometimes successfully challenges international expertise based on post-conflict cases that didn't involve ongoing fighting.
These strategies do not eliminate power asymmetries - Ukraine remains materially dependent on external assistance. But they do create negotiating space within those constraints and influence how reconstruction governance takes shape.
Miranda Loli is a political scientist, specialising in international relations. Her research explores the role of international organisations; she has a keen interest in how local non-governmental actors make space for themselves in the international arena. Miranda is a Max Weber Fellow at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre. She is the Principal Investigator of the research project Forging reconstruction governance: global networks, authority and institutions (FORGE) and her recent publications include Inside out: internal and external pressures in the Western Balkans amidst global transformations and counter-peace dynamics.