Constitutions and Markets

Conference, 14-15 June 2007

The year 2007 marks the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. A half century of peaceful socio-economic development in which the European Union has expanded from the original 6 signatories to its current 27 member countries.

A half century marked by the interplay between the process of market integration and globalization and the process of constitutional and intergovernmental institutional reforms, not only of the unfinished European Constitution but also of constitutional, and market deregulation, reforms in former socialist countries, as well as in other European countries going through a process of regional decentralization.

This rich experience of how legal and political institutions can enhance–and be sustained by—the process of economic growth has not been limited to the European Union. In particular, the rapid growth of China, India and other developing economies, together with the contrast of less positive experiences, has shed new light on how different constitutional arrangements can affect–and be affected by—the development, and regulation, of markets.

In sum, 2007 is an appropriate year to gather together the latest multidisciplinary contributions on the theory and evidence of the interplay between Constitutions and Markets. This is the goal of the conference, which brings together leading political scientists, lawyers, economists and historians working on different aspects of its common underlying theme.

Programme (.pdf)

 

Conference Papers

Guido Tabellini: Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe

Leszek Balcerowicz: Institutional Change and Postcommunist Transition

Péter Cserne: Constitutional Courts and the Limits of Economic Policy: A Constitutional Political Economy Perspective of the Hungarian Experience

Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni: Endogenous Constitutions

Jennifer Gandhi: Economic Performance and the Unraveling of Hegemonic Parties

Colin Crouch: Markets and Governments: The Reciprocal Dialectic of Failures

Daron Acemoglu: Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: Constitutions and Global Markets: How to Define the ‘Development Objectives’ of the World Trading System?

Tor-Inge Harbo: The Function of a European Constitution: A Question of Legitimacy

Daniel Brou and Michele Ruta: Political (Dis)Integration, Rent Seeking and Growth

Harold James: Lessons from the Weimar Constitution

 

Scientific Committee

Giuliano Amato (Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs and EUI)

Leszek Balcerowicz (Warsaw School of Economics)

Christoph Buchheim (University of Mannheim)

Laszlo Bruszt (EUI)

Colin Crouch (University of Warwick)

Armin Hatje (University of Hamburg)

Harold James (EUI)

Christian Joerges (EUI)

Ramon Marimon (EUI, Chair)

Massimo Motta (EUI)

Adam Przeworski (New York University)

Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University)

Barry Weingast (Stanford University)

Page last updated on 18 August 2017

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